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NOTES AND COMMENTS 
United States - People's Republic of China 
Blocked Assets and Claims Problem: 
International and Domestic Law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Government recognized the Nationalist Government of 
the Republic of China in 1928. 1 This recognition continued through 1945 with 
the designation of the Nationalist Government to accept the Japanese sur-
render at the conclusion of World War II. In 1949 the People's Republic of 
China (P.R.C.) was proclaimed. The reaction of the State Department was 
indecisive and ambiguous. The United States assistance to the Nationalist 
Government in its attempt to reassert control of the mainland was limited to 
indirect measures and economic sanctions against the P. R. C. in the form of a 
trade embargo. 2 The issue of recognition i.e., which Chinese government to 
accord recognition to, was not settled until shortly after the Chinese interven-
tion in Korea on December 17, 1950. Reaction by the United States at this 
point was quick and decisive. The Treasury Department, under the authority 
of the Trading With The Enemy Act,3 initially blocked all assets and accounts 
of both Chinese governments and all Chinese nationals. The P.R.C. re-
sponded with the declaration on December 29, 1950 nationalizing all public 
and private assets of the United States. The initial hesitation of the State 
Department and President Truman to extend recognition to the P.R.C. 
hardened into a twenty-five year period of non-recognition. Recognition of 
the P.R.C. and the settlement of financial claims by the United States citizens 
arising out of the P.R.C.'s nationalization of U.S. assets in 1950 are two 
1. JOHN K. FAIRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 254-61 (3d ed. 1963); ROBERT FER· 
RELL, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 344-46, 462-65 (1959). 
2. See Lee & McCobb, United Slates Trade on China 1949-1970: Legal Status and Future Prospects, 4 
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1971); Cohen, Chinese Law and Sino-American Trade, in CHINA 
TRADE PROSPECTS AND U.S. POLICY (A. Eckstein ed. 1971). 
3. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U .S.C. app. S 1 (1970). For specific blocking 
authority, see 50 U.S.C. app. U 5(b), 6 (1970); Exec. Order No. 9193, 3 C.F.R. 1174 (1938-1943 
Compilation), amending, Exec. Order No. 9095, 3 C.F.R. 1121 (1938-1943 Compilation); 31 
C.F.R. S 500 (1977). 
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aspects of the complex bilateral international situation currently existing be-
tween the two countries. 
A. The International Political and Legal Milieu 
There exist three main components of the U.S.-P.R.C. impasse. Firstly, 
the P.R.C. maintains that the United States recognition of the Nationalist 
Government of China is a continuing intervention in a civil war. t This in-
tervention is symbolized by the 1954 Security Treaty' between the United 
States and the Nationalist Government. Secondly, both Chinese Governments 
maintain the position that each is the government of all of China in spite of the 
fact that in reality each is the government only of the territory that it controls. 
The final component of this complex international situation is that the United 
States policy of recognition is against the tide of international practice. 6 Since 
1971, the Nationalist Government has been expelled from China's seat at the 
United Nations and replaced by the P.R.C. Government. 7 In addition to 
this, more than fifty states have severed diplomatic relations with the Na-
tionalist Government leaving only 23 states that continue to recognize the Na-
tionalist Government.s Meanwhile the P.R.C.'s position in the international 
community has continued to strengthen. This is represented by the increase in 
the number of states from 47 in 1970 to 114 in 1977 that have accorded 
recognition to the P.R.C.9 The United States is the only major global power 
still according recognition to the Nationalist Government. 10 
The Joint Communique issued at the conclusion of President Nixon's 
China Trip in 1972 that has subsequently become known as the Shanghai 
Communiquell marked the beginning of the United States' interest in extend-
ing recognition to the P.R.C. In this communique the P.R.C. stated three in-
dispensable prerequisites for the establishment of full diplomatic relations be-
tween the two countries: 1) severance of relations with the Nationalist Govern-
ment; 2) withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan; and 3) the abrogation 
of the security treaty between the United States and the Nationalist Govern-
4. E.g., Oksenberg, The U.s. and China [hereinafter cited as Oksenberg] in CHINA ANDJAPAN: 
A NEW BALANCE OF POWER 270 (D. C. Hellman ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Hellman]; Letter 
from Prof. Thomas Bernstein, East Asian Institute, Columbia University to Editor, N. Y. Times, 
Aug. 9,1976, at 23, col. 5; Some Small Steps TowardP,king, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1977, at2, col. 5. 
5. Mutual Defense Treaty, Dec. 2,1954, United States-Republic of China, 6 U.S.T. 433, 
T.I.A.S. No. 3178. 
6. One of the sources of international law is the practice of states. STATUTE OF THE INTERNA· 
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38; see also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 1-32 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as BROWNLIE]. 




11. The text of the Shanghai Communique is reprinted in 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 435 (1972). 
For a full discussion of Sino-American relations see Eckstein, Sino-American Economic R,laJions and 
Barnds, China in American Foreign Policy, in CHINA AND AMERICA: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW RELA· 
TIONSHIP (W. J. Barnds ed. 1976). 
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ment. This position has been reaffirmed by the P.R.C. within the past two 
years. 12 
Despite these recent reaffirmations, there have been indications that the 
P.R.C. regards its defense problem with respect to the U.S.S.R. as a more 
important problem than the Taiwan issue which has become of secondary im-
portance. 13 If this is so, then there is reason to believe that the conditions set 
forth in the Shanghai Communique are not as indispensable as the P.R.C. 
maintains. As the importance of their defense problem grows, so grows their 
desire for normalization of relations with the United States, since normaliza-
tion would function to solidify the P.R.C.'s international position vis-a-vis the 
U.S.S.R. 
The international economic situation of the P.R.C. deteriorated in 197614 
and the P.R.C. re-initiated diplomatic level discussions with the United States 
regarding the settlement of the blocked assets and claims problem early in 
1977. 15 Until the claims problem is resolved the P.R.C. will not be eligible for 
the United States Export-Import Bank Credits. 16 Other areas of possible 
economic assistance by the United States include benefits under the following 
programs: 
1) Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)17 
2) Most-Favored Nation Principlel8 
3) Export Administration Act of 196919 
4) Johnson Debt Default Act20 
12. See, e.g., China Wants Total Pullout by U.S. from Taiwan, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1977, at 6, col. 
1; Safire, To Catch a Flea, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1977, at 25, col. 2. 
13. See, e.g., Ball,Against Uncravenly Yielding to Peking, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1977, at 19, col. 1. 
For a discussion of the social and historical aspects of China's attempt to forge a foreign policy see 
Terrill, China and the World: Self-Reliance or Interdependence, 55 For. AfT. 295 (1977); see also Perkins, 
The Constraints on Chinese Foreign Policy and Robinson, Political and Strategic Aspects of Chinese Foreign 
Policy, in Hellman, supra note 4. 
14. China Said to Falter in Its Economy in '76, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1977, at 4, col. 1. For the 
relationship of the business climate between the PRC and the U.S. see Doing Business With China, 
N.Y. Times, May 9, 1977, at 30, col. 1; The Chinese Seem to Mean Business, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 
1977, at 26, col. 1. 
15. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1977, at 1, col. 3, for the U.S. receiving indications that China 
would like to begin talks on settling financial claims on the way to the normalization of trade rela-
tions; see also Guertzman, u.s. Quietly Begins Talks With Chinese on Financial Claims, N.Y. Times, 
May 2, 1977, at 1, col. 6. 
16. But see Victor H. Li who writes: "Nothing in the language of the establishing act prohibits 
the Export-Import Bank from dealing with a country not recognized dejure by the United States, 
or with which there are not diplomatic relations." VICTOR H. LI, DE-RECOGNIZING TAIWAN: 
THE LEGAL PROBLEMS 21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LI]. 
17. 22 U.S.C. S 2191 (1970) as covered by the provisions of 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (b), (f), (t) 
(1970). 
18. 19 U.S.C. H 1881, 1202 (1970). 
19. 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (1970); 19 C.F.R. S 134.1 (1977). 
20. 18 U.S.C. S 955 (1970). S 955 describes punishments to be meted out against industries 
and corporations who make loans to foreign governments in default of payments owing to the 
United States. 
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5) Arms Transfers Programs21 
6) Immigration Status22 
These are important carrots for their faltering international economy. Fur-
thermore, property of the P .R.C., such as ships, are subject to court attach-
ment in American territory by U.S. claimants. 23 
United States policy toward the P.R.C. has been cautious but there are in-
dications that a normalization of relations may occur in the future. The 
United States Asia policy has recently "conspicuously ignored" the Na-
tionalist Government. 24 Senator Kennedy and former Senator Hugh Scott 
have been strong advocates of shifting formal recognition from the Nationalist 
Government to the P.R.C.2~ In fact, this has been the unofficial practice ofthe 
United States. The Nationalist Government, with a fully staffed embassy in 
Washington, theoretically has a higher level of representation than the 
P.R.C., which conducts diplomatic relations with the United States through a 
liaison office. Yet, Taiwan's Ambassador James Shen has not met with an 
American Secretary of State since 1973, while Peking's top envoy has met fre-
quently with Kissinger, Vance and even with the President himself. 26 
B. The Problem 
The Carter Administration's desire to normalize relations with the P.R.C. 
in areas other than recognition, in order to avoid having to face the prospects 
of the "derecognition" of the Nationalist Government, appears to be based on 
sound diplomatic practice, i. e., seeking agreement first in areas of overlapping 
21. Arms transfers are governed by several provisions that have been brought together under a 
unified statutory scheme: The International Security Assistance and Arms Control Export Act of 
1976, 22 U.S.C. S 2151 (Supp. 1978). 
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970). For an in-depth discussion of this provision and all of the provi-
sions discussed in notes 16-22 supra, see LI, supra note 16, at 21-30. 
23. Oksenberg, supra note 4, at 270. 
24. Address by Secretary of State Vance to the Asia Society, N.Y. Times,July 1,1977, at 11, 
col. 2. Contrast this with: U.S. Policy With Respect to MainltJnd China: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). 
25. See Recognizing Peking, Protecting Taiwan, N. Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1977, at 20, col. 1, support-
ing a speech by Senator Kennedy calling for the shift of formal recognition to Peking allowing the 
mutual defense treaty to lapse, and promising Taiwan unilaterally that the U.S. would offer pro-
tection and continued economic aid. For Senator Scott's position, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1977, 
at 9, col. 1. For a discussion of some of the problems involved ifformal recognition is withdrawn 
from the Republic of China and an attempt to discourage such a policy, s« Chiu, NOmuJlizing 
ReltJtions with China: Some Practical and Legal Problems, 5 ASIAN AFFAIRS 67 (1977); H. Chiu, Legal 
Aspects of Recognizing the People's Republic of China: Selected Issues, (April 28, 1978) (un-
published paper delivered at the 72d Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law) (copy available in the Boston College International and Comparative Law Journal offices). 
26. U.S. Is Said to Fear Peking's Ire if Taipei Names New Envoy, N.Y. Times, May 12,1977, at 2, 
col. 6. 
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interests and later in areas of conflict. However, as this Comment will 
demonstrate, recognition of the P.R.C. by the United States is a prerequisite 
to one of the less controversial issues between the two states that has received 
attention, namely the settling of the blocked assets-claims problem. The prob-
lem that exists regarding recognition is that there are two Chinese govern-
ments purporting to represent the entire Chinese nation. The United States 
currently recognizes the Nationalist Government of Taiwan which represents 
some 16 million Chinese who fled the mainland after the P.R.C. assumed con-
trol of the mainland in 1949. The P.R.C. governs the China mainland which 
consists of some 900 million people. The United States, for ideological and 
security reasons, has recognized and supported the Nationalist Government of 
Taiwan. Several possibilities exist for the United States as it seeks to re-
evaluate the recognition policy toward the Chinese governments. One 
possibility is the "German Solution" which recognized the existence of two 
German states within one German nation. A second possibility is a "Swiss" 
or "Hong Kong" conception under which the P.R.C. would receive recogni-
tion as the Government of China and the Nationalist Government of Taiwan 
would become a neutral state or entity,27 The problem with these suggestions, 
as with others that will be discussed,28 is that the P.R.C. wants recognition ex-
tended to it as the sole government of China including Taiwan with eventual 
goal of reunification. However, as has been observed, there are indications 
that this desire has become of secondary interest. 
Since it is clear that recognition of the P.R.C. by the United States is no 
longer a matter of "if" but rather of "when" and "how", the desirability of 
accompanying a lump sum settlement of the claim-assets problem with the 
recognition of the P.R.C. will be examined. The reasons for this approach are 
two-fold: First, the international law of recognition and its application in the 
United States Courts requires that any settlement of the blocked assets-claims 
problem occur simultaneously with recognition of the P.R.C. as the Govern-
ment of China. Secondly, there exist several factors in favor of negotiati~g a 
lump sum settlement agreement between the United States and the P.R.C. 
even though compensation to United States claimants would only be at twenty 
to thirty percent of their face value. 
Presently there exist approximately eighty million dollars of Chinese assets 
in the United States and two hundred million dollars of nationalized United 
States nationals' claims in the P.R.C. But since two governments purport to 
represent the Chinese nation in claiming the assets blocked in the United 
States, as soon as they are unblocked by Treasury Department regulations 
both "Chinas" would sue for recovery in United States Courts. This is why 
27. For a full discussion, see Solomon, Thinking Through the ChinIJ Problem, 56 FOR. AFF. 324 
(1977). 
28. See, e.g., notes 86-87 infra and accompanying text. 
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an executive determination of its policy of recognition toward the Chinese 
governments must be clarified. Technically, if the assets in the United States 
were unblocked today, the Nationalist Government as the officially recognized 
government of China by the State Department would have rights to those 
assets.29 Thus there would be no funds by which to effectuate a lump sum 
agreement between the United States and the P.R.C. By recognizing the 
P.R.C. as the Government of China, such an executive determination would 
preclude the Nationalist Government from successfully litigating those funds 
in United States Courts. In this way, the P.R.C., as the sole recognized 
government of China by the United States, would have ownership capacity to 
turn over the blocked assets in the U.S. to the U.S. government without the 
Nationalist Government litigating the question of ownership and control of 
these assets in U.S. courts. 
II. RECOGNITION 
A. The International Law of Recognition 
1. Constitutive v. Declaratory Views 
There are two main views concerning the nature and legal significance of 
recognition: the" constitutive view" and the" declaratory view." According 
to the constitutive view an entity becomes a state exclusively through the acts 
of recognition by other states. 30 
Under the constitutive view a state has no legal existence before recogni-
tion. Such a position entails several difficulties. 31 Fitzmaurice discusses the 
constitutive view and its implications stating: 
On this view, an entity may have in all respects the characteristics of, 
and indeed be, a fully sovereign independent State, but yet it cannot 
rank as an international person unless it receives recognition as such 
from the existing members of the international society. According to 
this view, recognition - even if it does not create the statal entity -
does create the international rights and obligations . . . . The more 
moderate supporters of the constitutive view do not go so far as that. 
They admit that once the marks and characteristics are there, a duty 
to recognize arises. But they still maintain that unless recognition is 
in fact accorded, there is, in law, no new international person. 32 
29. This is not entirely true since some are assets of private individuals blocked because of their 
connection with the PRC. 
30. BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 93. 
31. E.g., BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 138-39, (6th ed. Waldock 1963) [hereinafter cited as 
BRIERLY]. 
32. Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law, Considered From the Standpoint of the 
Rule of Law, 92 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS 5, 19-20 (II, 1957) [hereinafter cited as 
Fitzmaurice]. 
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In contrast, the declaratory view does not promise recogmtIOn by other 
states as the only vehicle for a state to become an international person, i. e., 
recognition does not bring into existence a state that did not exist prior to the 
recognition. Further, 
[a] state may exist without being recognized, and if it does exist in 
fact, then, whether or not it has been formally recognized by other 
states, it has a right to be treated by them as a state. The primary 
function of recognition is to acknowledge as fact something which 
has hitherto been uncertain, namely the independence of the body 
claiming t() be a state, and to declare the recognizing state's 
readiness to accept the normal consequences of that fact, namely the 
usual courtesies of international intercourse. 33 
Fitzmaurice clearly distinguishes the former position from that of the latter. 
The essence of the declaratory view is that recognition does not 
create or constitute the new international person but, on the basis of 
the facts, registers, records, certifies, or witnesses to its existence as 
such .... It does not create or constitute it, but it certifies - what 
might otherwise be doubtful or uncertain - that it exists, i.e., that 
the entity concerned does indeed possess the characteristics of an in-
dependent State, and that it therefore is an international person. It is 
not of course the fact that the declaratory view predicates recognition 
on the basis of the mere existence of an entity as an entity of a statal 
or para-statal character. This view requires the entity to bear the 
marks, and have the characteristics, of a fully sovereign independent 
State. All it says is that when those marks and characteristics do ex-
ist, then there is an international person. 34 
Article three of the Convention On Rights and Duties of States35 signed at 
Montevideo stated what is essentially the declaratory view. 
Art. 3. The political existence of the state is independent ofrecogni-
tion of other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to 
defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conserva-
tion and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, 
to legislate upon its interest, administer its services, and to define the 
jurisdiction and competence of its courts. 
The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exer-
cise of the rights of other states according to international law. 36 
Conflict between the declaratory view and the constitutive view 1S 
33. BRIERLY, supra note 31, at 139. 
34. Fitzmaurice, supra note 32. 
35. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933,49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 
165 L.N.T.S. 19. 
36. /d. 
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manifested by the issue of whether or not there is a duty to recognize political 
communities that have fulfilled the conditions prescribed by international law 
for statehood.37 In emphasizing the political nature of recognition DeVisscher 
explains the controversy concerning the declaratory or constitutive effects of 
recognition: 
Legally, recognition is simply a declaratory act. Politically, it is not 
so. Recognition puts an end, for the recognized State, to an uncer-
tain situation, and the positive advantages that it secures not only for 
the recognized but also for the recognizing State create a new situa-
tion. 38 
Much of the difficulty arising from the application of the constitutive view is 
eliminated if several points can be conceded. It has been argued, however, 
that if such points are conceded it is no longer the constitutive view. First, 
although an unrecognized entity may not be a full international person it is not 
devoid of all international personality and may possess a measure of interna-
tional personality. Secondly, such a measure of international personality pro-
vides it with the minimum rights and obligations necessary to function with 
states. Thirdly, although implicit recognition by conduct or otherwise may oc-
cur, such a position results from the facts of the situation and not from the for-
mal act of recognition. 39 
There exists a divergence of opinion concerning the duty of states to extend 
recognition to an entity that meets the requirements of statehood. On the one 
hand Lauterpacht emphasizes that recognitionin such instances is an obliga-
tion: 
The emphasis - and that emphasis is a constant feature of 
diplomatic correspondence - on the principle that the existence of a 
37. The concept.of the State has been defined in varying ways: 1) Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States, supra note 35, art. 1 states: "The state as a person of international law should 
possess the following qualifications: (a) permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) govern-
ment; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states; 2) RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES S 4 (1965) states: "Except as otherwise in-
dicated 'state' as used in the Restatement of this subject, means an entity that has a defined ter-
ritory and population under the control of a government and that engages in foreign relations. " ; 
(3) Fitzmaurice supra, note 32, at 13 states: 
A State for international purposes may, however, perhaps be described generally as an en-
tity which, possessing certain physical characteristics in the way of territory, a population, 
and governmental institutions, is self-contained and not part of a wider political unit; and 
which also has the capacity to enter into relations on the external plane with other States -
either directly (in the case of fully sovereign independent States), or mediately, through 
other States (in the case of protected States). 
38. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (rev.ed. Corbett 
trans. 1968), cited from W. FREIDMAN, O. LISSITZYN & R. PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 165 (1969). 
39. Fitzmaurice, supra note 32, at 31. 
1978] U.S.-P.R.C. BLOCKED ASSETS AND CLAIMS 
state (or of a government) is a question of fact signifies that, 
whenever the necessary factual requirements exist, the granting of 
recognition is a matter oflegal duty. 40 
89 
This view is not shared by the United States. It is maintained in section 99 (1) 
of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States that: 
A state is not required by international law to recognize an entity as 
a state or a regime as the government of a state. 
2. De Facto v. De Jure Recognition 
The difference between de facto and de jure recognition exists initially from 
the perspective of the state extending the recognition. If it is the judgment of 
the recognizing state that the new state is not yet in a position to fulfill all of the 
conditions of statehood, it may extend defacto recognition which is provisional 
in nature. By contrast, de jure recognition is of a full and complete nature.4' 
Fitzmaurice elaborates on the nature of de facto recognition writing: 
De facto recognition is therefore a provisional measure of recogni-
tion, given by a state which considers that at least the most impor-
tant condition of statehood and international personality is present 
- namely possession of specific territory on a basis of freedom from 
external control - but is not yet satisfied as to the permanence of 
this state of affairs .... De facto recognition, whether of a new 
government or particular authority of a government or administra-
tion within a certain territory or areas, is on a basis of freedom from 
external control. 42 
De jure recognition carries with it membership in international organiza-
tions, and more importantly for the issues under discussion, the right to retain 
title to and control over assets situated abroad. De facto recognition, since it is 
based on effective control only within the territory, concerned carries with it 
no recognition of external authority. In addition, representatives of a govern-
ment may not be entitled to full diplomatic immunities. 43 
Since recognition or non-recognition is so closely connected with interna-
tional law, certain generally accepted rules and norms are usually given 
deference when at issue in the domestic courts of States. For instance, States 
normally allow recognized states to bring proceedings in their domestic courts. 
40. H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1947) [hereinafter cited as 
LAUTERPACHT]. 
41. W. L. TUNG, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN ORGANIZING WORLD 51 (1965); see also 
Waldock, Genual Course on Public International Law, 106 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS 138 (II, 
1962); Jennings, Genual Course on Principles of International Law, 121 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS 
349 (II, 1967). 
42. Fitzmaurice, supra note 32, at 27. 
43. Fitzmaurice, supra note 32, at 29; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 40, at 343-46. 
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Likewise, a recognized state, as a rule, cannot be subjected to proceedings to 
foreign domestic courts without its consent. Of course, the interpretation and 
application of these general rules varies from state to state according to the cir-
cumstances. 
B. The United States Policy Regarding Recognition 
The U.S. government policy of non-recognition of the P.R.C. has been 
marked by both ambiguity and complexity. According to a statement in the 
U.S. State Department Bulletin, the U.S. viewed the P.R.C. as defacto in the 
sense of being temporary and hostile to U.S. interests, but not to the extent 
that the P.R.C. did not exercise control over its territory." Defacto recognition 
has also been assigned to the' Regime by so eminent a scholar as Quincy 
Wright who wrote in 1968: 
The Chinese communist government had gained control of substan-
tially all of mainland China by the end of 1940 and has apparently 
increased the effectiveness of that control since then. 
It appears that the Communist government is a general de facto 
government in the sense used in the Tinoco Arbitration and in the 
traditional practice of States. 45 
Lauterpacht has commented that state practice does not deny such a status to 
government whose predecessor holds out in an "isolated fortress. "46 
The dejure recognition accorded the Nationalist Chinese government by the 
U.S. government must be tempered with Wright's conclusion: 
That government [Taiwan 1 is however, de facto the government 
only for Formosa and the Pescadores and of some of the small islands 
off the mainland coast opposite Formosa. Sporadic hostilities have 
occurred in some of these small islands, but substantially the Na-
tionalist government is the de facto government of the former 
Japanese territory of Formosa and the PescadoresY 
H. u.s. Policy on Non-Recognition of Communist China, 39 DEP'T STATE BULL. 385 (1958). 
45. Wright, The Chinese Recognition Problem, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY 602 (Gross ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Wright]. 
46. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 40. On the matter of recognition and the problems involved, s« 
Briggs, Recognition of States, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 113 (1949); Brown, The Legal Effects of Recognition, 
HAM. J. INT'L L. 617 (1950); CHEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF REGOGNITION (1951); Lauter-
pacht, Recognition of States in International Law, 53 YALEL.J. 385 (19H); Kelsen, Recognition in Inter-
national Law: InecreticalObservations, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 605 (1941); Borchard, Recognition and 
Non-Recognition, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 108 (1942); 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 161, 166-67,319-20 (1940); 1 L. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 148-204 (2d ed. 1945); 
Lauterpacht, Recognition of Govemments, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 815 (1945); PATEL, RECOGNmONIN 
THE LAW OF NATIONS (1959); Meeker, Recognition and the Restatement, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 83 
(1966); 1 J.B. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 72-164 (1906) (see especially 72-74). 
47. Wright, supra note 45, at 605. 
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An explicit distinction between de jure recognition and de facto recognition of 
foreign entities appears infrequently in the statutory law48 of the United 
States, although there has been some confusion in the courts of the United 
States. 49 
In the wake of this scenario lie the problems surrounding the Chinese claims 
to blocked U.S. assets and the U.S. nationals' claims to assets nationalized by 
the P.R.C. The necessary consequences of U.S. recognition of the P.R.C. in~ 
volve a complex determination depending upon, inter alia: 1) the coincident 
circumstances surrounding recognition and; 2) the nature of that recognition. 
The relationship between recognition and a possible lump sum claim settle-
ment will be discussed in detail later in this comment. 50 
C. Recognition in United States Courts 
The issue of recognition must be looked at from the perspective of U.S. 
Federal municipal law because as Greig has cogently commented: 
Although the practice of state does establish the existence of both de 
fact and de jure recognition, any legal distinction between the two 
arises in the municipal law of the recognizing state rather than in the 
sphere of international law . 51 
Like the Act of State Doctrine which precludes judgment by U.S. Courts with 
regard to the acts of state of another government within its own territory, the 
exercise of discretion over whether or not to give effect to an act of state affect-
ing property under the jurisdiction of U.S. Courts is tied to public policy and 
executive policy. 52 
According to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the U. S. acts of 
state are to be given effect in the U. S. only if they are consistent with public 
policy. In Vladikavkazsky R. Y. Co. v. N. Y. Trust Co. 53 it was concluded that 
48. For some examples of recognition not making any difference, see 50 U.S.C. § 852 (1970); 
22 U.S.C. U 611, 613 (1970); 49 U.S.C. § 781 (1970) as applied to private citizens; see also 22 
U.S.C. § 288(1) (1970). But see 50 U.S.C. S 852 (1970) and 22 U.S.C. § 613 (1970) as applied to 
foreign officials; 71 Stat. 642, 643 (1957) and 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(15)(G)(1970) relative to type of 
visas and immigration status granted; 12 U.S.C. S 632 (1970) as applied to transfers of property 
by the Federal Reserve Bank. For a full treatment of these and other statutory distinctions see LI, 
supra note 16, at 14-15. 
49. See, e.g., Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1 (1932); Chan Chuen v. Esperdy, 285 
F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1960). 
50. See the discussion of recognition and Lump Sum in § IV irifra. 
51. D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (1970). 
52. See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Alfred 
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). For a discussion of the Act of 
State Doctrine and the new Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see Comment, Sovereign Immunity 
- A Statutory Approach to A Persistent Problem, 1 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 223 (1977). 
53. 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934). 
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confiscation of corporate assets is contrary to public policy in the U.S. A 
deviation from this view is asserted in U. S. v. BelmontH and U. S. v. Pink55 
where federal executive authority in the field of foreign relations was held to be 
determinative. The latter two decisions indicated that recognition requires the 
state to give extraterritorial effect to all acts of state of a previously unrecogn-
ized state only when coincident with executive sanction as was expressed in 
these cases by the Litvinov Assignment. 56 
This qualification was determinative in the holding in the Republic oj Iraq v. 
First National Ci91 Bank. 57 There the principal question raised was the applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine to foreign confiscation decrees purporting the 
affect property within the U.S., i.e., property located outside the nationalizing 
state. In this decision the court held that .such extraterritorial application of a 
confiscation decree was contrary to public policy in the U.S. Furthermore, in 
the absence of executive pronouncements to the contrary, the court denied the 
extraterritorial application of the decree in the U.S. 
The absence of an executive pronouncement, played an important role in 
two other cases associated with Republic of Iraq. In Vladikavkazsky the court 
stated: 
It is hardly necessary to state that the arbitrary dissolution of a cor-
poration, the confiscation of its assets and the repudiation of its 
obligations by decrees, is contrary to our public policy and shocking 
to our sense of justice and equity. That the confiscation decree in 
question, clearly contrary to our public policy, was enacted by a 
government recognized by the U.S., offers no controlling reason 
why it should be enforced in our courts. 58 
In the second case, Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Socie9l, the court stated: 
Recognition does not compel our courts to give effect to foreign laws 
if they are contrary to our public policy. Some writers have sug-
gested that non-recognition was an insufficient reason for the refusal 
of our courts to enforce the laws of another country, rather it should 
have been that those were contrary to our public policy.59 
Also in this group of cases holding that determinative effect should be given to 
the public policy if the U.S. in the absence of executive pronouncements are 
Russian Reinsurance Company v. Stoddard 60 and Russian S. F. S. Republic v. 
Cibrario. 61 When there is conflict between public policy and comity, justice and 
54. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
55. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
56. See S IV, A infra; see also note 68 infra. 
57. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965). 
58. Note 53 supra, at 460. 
59. 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897, 903 (1934). 
60. 240 N.Y. 149; 147 N.E. 703 (1925). 
61. 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923). 
1978) U.S.-P.R.C. BLOCKED ASSETS AND CLAIMS 93 
equity, as embodied in public policy, must prevail. Laws and decrees of 
foreign governments have effect in the United States as a privilege of comity, 
not of right. 
Municipal courts will look to the Executive as well as public policy for 
guidance. When public policy is not to the contrary, the approach of the court 
will be from the perspective of fairness and justice when it will not harm the 
self-interest of the nation to do so, as was the situation in both Upright v. Mer-
cury Business Machines CO.62 and Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner and Keeler Ltd. 63 
The second group of cases is made up of those in which executive pro-
nouncements are determinative of public policy or in place of public policy as 
perceived by the judicial branch. The cases relevant to discussion in this con-
text include Belmont,6. Pink,65 United States v. Curtiss- Wright Corp.,66 and Guar-
an9' Trust Co. v. United States. 67 In Pink the Court required that full credit be ac-
corded to those acts expressly sanctioned by the executive. Such executive 
sanctions are not to be implied from recognition per se. This decision assigned 
supremacy to the executive in foreign relations and advanced such (in form of 
an international compact of which the Litvinov Assignment was a part) as a 
controlling factor in allowing the U.S. claim to assets confiscated by Russian 
decrees simultaneous with the recognition of the Soviet government by the 
U.S. It was in this context that recognition operated retroactively to validate 
Russian claims to assets located extraterritorially. 
In Curtiss-Wright Corp., the Executive right to remove impediments to 
recognition was emphasized. In such situations the Litvinov Assignment, 
recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, and the assignment of 
assets of nationalized corporations in the U.S. to the custodianship of the U.S. 
under the terms of the Assignment, were recognized as part and parcel of an 
international agreement. 68 In such a context, recognition was interpreted to 
62. 13 A.D.2d 36,213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1961). 
63. (1966)1 A.C. 853. 
64. Note 41 supra. 
65. Note 42 supra. 
66. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
67. 304 U.S. 126 (1938). 
68. The authority and validity of such agreements is fairly well-established: 
Scholarly and apolitical controversy has recurrently raged over the scope of the power of the 
United States Government to enter into international agreements. Disagreement has even 
arisen over the limits of the power to conclude treaties with the consent of the Senate. Even 
more dissension has been prompted by the increasing use of executive agreements, par-
ticularly those concluded by the President without any Congressional action. Are they, like 
treaties, the "supreme law ofthe land?" This article will suggest that they are and will sup-
port this conclusion with an analysis of United States v. Pinlc, a case dealing with such an ex-
ecutive agreement. The case had a dramatic effect on state law in the United States and now 
stands as an extreme demonstration of the authority in internal law of international 
agreements. 
Cardozo, The Autlwrity in Law of International Treaties: The Pinlc Case, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 544 
(1962). Cardozo later concludes, "Only in the rarest circumstances is a president likely to try to 
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involve the extraterritorial application of the acts of state in question. 69 
D. Status of Blocked Chinese Assets in United States Courts. 
The two largest categories of Chinese assets blocked by the United States 
are: 
1) assets of the Chinese government and agencies and; 
2) assets of Chinese corporations. 
Suits were filed by both the P.R.C. and the Nationalist Governments claim-
ing the government and the corporate assets. Representative of suits for the 
government and agency assets is Chase National Bank v. Directorate General of 
Postal Remittances and Savings Bank. 70 This case was eventually dismissed on ap-
peal,71 the court denying the P.R.C. standing72 because of United States ex-
ecutive determination and refusal to extend recognition. Hence, the Na-
tionalist Government of China remained the only claimant with standing. 
exercise the full measure of his powers as they are delineated in United States v. Pink. Should he 
find this necessary, however, the case stands firmly as authority that an international agreement, 
executed within the broad scope of the treaty power, may constitutionally have a profound effect 
on internal law in the nation." /d. at 553; see also Comment, Self-Executing Agreement: A Separation of 
Powers Problems, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 137 (1974) for possible problems if the separation of powers 
problem does arise. However, "[g)iven the present state oflaw, there is no reason to believe that 
they would not defer to such a conceptually similar device as a Chinese assignment, especially if 
concluded as part of a clear foreign affairs function such as recognition of a foreign state, as was 
its predecessor, the Litvinov Assignment." Bayer, irifra note 110, at 1005. For a full discussion see 
L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972); Moore, Treaties and Executive 
Agreements, 20 POLITICAL SCI. Q. 385 (1905); CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 
228-40 (1940); McDougall & Lans, Treaties and Congressional, Executive or Presidential Agreements: In-
terchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE LJ. 181,534 (1945); Matthews, The Constitu-
tional Power of the President to Conclude International Agreements, 64 YALE LJ. 345 (1955); U.S. Dep't 
of State, Circular No. 175, (December 13, 1955) reprinted in 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1956) (outlin-
ing the appropriate uses for executive agreements). For a recent view see Rovine, Separation of 
Powers and International Executive Agreements, 52 IND. L. J. 397 (1977). 
69. Stevenson, Effect of Recognition on the Application of Private International Law Norms, 51 COLUM. 
L. REV. 710 (1951); Barchard, Extraterritorial Confiscations, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 275 (1942). 
70. 112 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. 1950), modified, 278 App. Div. 820, 824; 105 N.Y.S.2d 416, re-
argument granted, 278 App. Div. 936, 105 N.Y.S.2d 924, orig. determination upheld, 278 App. Div. 
935, 105 N.Y.S.2d 923, motion for leave to appeal denied, 279 App. Div. 576, 107 N.Y.S.2d 542 
(1951). 
71. 303 N.Y. 800, 104 N.E.2d 360 (1952). 
72. The court cited Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario 235 N.Y. 225, 
139 N.E. 259 (1923). There have been numerous decisions rendered by the U.S. courts at the 
time of, or subsequent to, the Soviet confiscation decrees but prior to the November 16, 1933 date 
of recognition of the Soviet government by the U.S. Wulfsohn v. Russian S.F.S. Republic, 234 
N.Y. 372,138 N.E. 24 (1923); Sokoloffv. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 
(1924); Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Insurance Co., 239 N.Y. 248, 146 N.E. 369 
(1925); Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925); Petrogradsky 
Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479 (1930); 
Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933). After recognition was 
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A second case involving assets of the pre-1949 Chinese Government or an 
agency thereof is the Republic of China v. American Express Company. 73 In this in-
stance, procedural matters held up the P.R.C. 's attempt to claim the assets in 
United States courts until Chase National Bank74 was decided. By viewing the 
P.R.C. agency as an arm of the P.R.C. Government, hence denying it stand-
ing, the court in Chase National Bank discouraged the P.R.C. from continuing 
to pursue its claim in American Express Company. 75 
Two cases are illustrative of the P.R.C. and the Nationalist Governments 
litigating in U.S. courts for Chinese corporate assets that are blocked by the 
U.S. Treasury Regulations. 76 They are: Chase Manhattan Bank v. United China 
Syndicate, Ltd. 77 and Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust 
Company. 78 
accorded by the U.S., a number of other decisions were rendered, including Vladikavkazsky Ry. 
Co. v. N.Y. Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934); Dougherty v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Society, 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934). 
Where the issue has been dealt with in the above-mentioned cases, the result has been that, 
prior to recognition of the Soviet government by the U. S., the courts have generally declined to 
give recognition to the extraterritorial effect of the Soviet confiscation decrees by which Russian 
corporations, in existence at the time of the commencement of the existence of the Soviet govern-
ment, were nationalized with regard to assets in the U.S. Such decisions have been rendered on 
the grounds that such acts were contrary to the public policy of the State of New York and the 
U.S. In two of these cases, Fred S. jarrus & Co. and Vladikavlcazsky Ry., it was suggested that the 
decisions reached would have been rendered even after recognition. 
In Equitable Life Assurance SOC), which involved contracts made by Russian national to be per-
formed in Russia, the U.S. government's recognition of the Soviet government validated all of 
the Soviet government's decrees from the time of its inception. Most importantly, however, the 
courts have not held that "the effect of such decrees either before or after recognition can compel 
our courts to refrain from proceeding according to the laws and policies of our forum as to the 
assets of the nationalized corporation within our jurisdiction." United States v. President and 
Directors of Manhattan Co., 276 N.Y. 396,12 N.E.2d 518, (1938),522. In United States v. Bel-
mont, 85 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1936), the court held that the nationalization decree, if enforced, 
would give effect to a nationalization act contrary to N.Y. and U.S. public policy. The Supreme 
Court, in reversing this decision, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), gave notice to the coincident Litvinov 
Assignment as being part of the act of recognition by the U.S., the executive policy as deter-
minate and that the effect of all of this, by executive intent, was to validate all acts of the Soviet 
government from the commencement of its existence. The validity of such confiscation decrees 
was accorded in, and only in, the large context of the coincident Litvinov Assignment in so far as 
the rights of U. S. nationals and counterclaims thereto were given access in courts for assertion of 
those claims. 
One question under consideration in the present situation concerns the necessary consequences 
of recognition of the Communist Regime in China by the U.S. government for assets in the U.S. 
of China and Chinese corporations and if that recognition did occur would the Regime get hold of 
some or all of these assets either through proceedings in U.S. Courts or otherwise? Secondly, 
would there be a difference in this respect between cle jure and cle facto recognition? 
73. 95 F. Supp. 740 (S.D. N.Y.); appeal dismissed, 190 F.2d 334 (2d Cir.); orcler aff'd, 195 F.2d 
230 (2d Cir. 1951); remancled 108 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
74. Note 70 supra. 
75. Note 73 supra. 
76. Note 3 supra. 
77. 180 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
78. 92 F. Supp. 920 (N.D.Cal. 1950), aff'd, 190 F.2d 10tO (9th Cir. 1951),jutigment renclered, 
t04 F. Supp. 59 (N.D.Cal. 1952), modified & aff'd, 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953). 
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With regard to the latter case, the Bank of China was organized under 
Chinese law in 1912, the Chinese government owned two thirds ofthe Bank's 
stock and a substantial deposit was held with the Wells Fargo Bank and Union 
Trust Co. After the P.R.C. Regime gained control ofthe mainland, the main 
office of the Bank was moved to Hong Kong with P.R.C. authorities taking 
over the old main office. Later the Hong Kong directors of the bank sought to 
recover the deposit with the Wells Fargo Bank, as did the P.R.C. 
The initial District Court decision continued the case sine die rather than 
decide in favor of either group purporting to represent the Bank of China. The 
court stated in its opinion that recognition of the acts of the Regime, insofar as 
they relate merely to a Chinese corporation, might not be contrary to the U.S. 
policy of non-recognition. Moreover, the court surmised that U.S. policy 
toward the P.R.C. Regime appeared to be one of intervention and that plac-
ing 626,860.07 dollars in its possession would be contrary to such a U.S. 
policy. "The only solution which gives promise of affording protection to the 
Bank of China, its stockholders, depositors, and at the same time supporting 
the foreign policy of the U.S., is to leave these funds where they are for the 
present. "79 
At a later stage of litigation, reconsidering the case in light of changing 
world conditions (Korean War),80 the District Court ordered funds to the 
Bank of China as represented by the Nationalist government. 81 The deter-
minative nature of Executive policy was present in this holding also. In its 
79. 92 F. Supp. 920 (N.D. Cal. 1950), reprinted in part in R. SWIIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CURRENT AND CLASSIC 66-70 (1969), from which the discussion ofthis case is drawn. In National 
City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), Frankfurter, J. wrote at 
361-63 (notes omitted): 
And so we come to the immediate situation before us. The short of the matter is that we are 
not dealing with an attempt to bring a recognized foreign government into one of our courts 
as a defendant and subject it to the rule of law to which non-governmental obligors must 
bow. We have a foreign government invoking our law but resisting a claim against it which 
fairly would curtail its recovery. It wants our law, like any other litigant, but it wants our law 
free from the claims of justice. It becomes vital, therefore, to examine the extent to which the 
considerations which led this Court to bar a suit against a sovereign in The Schooner Ex-
change are applicable here to foreclose a court from determining according to prevailing 
law, whether the republic of China's claim against the National City Bank would be unjustly 
enforced by disregarding legitimate claims against the Republic of China. As expounded in 
The Schooner Exchange, the doctrine is one of implied consent by the territorial sovereign to 
exempt the foreign from its "exclusive and absolute" jurisdiction, the implication deriving 
from standards of public morality, fair dealing, reciprocal self-interest, and respect for the 
"power and dignity" of the foreign sovereign. 
The Court of Claims is available to foreign nationals (or their governments) on a simple 
condition: that the foreign national's government can be sued in its courts on claims by our 
citizens. 
80. While initially freezing the assets from both governments, after the perceived hostility in 
the Korean War the court awarded the funds to the Nationalist Government. 
81. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D.Cal. 
1952). 
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decision, the court stated that it was not proper for a domestic court to deter-
mine which government best represents the interests of the Chinese State. 
However, the court went on noting that if there were only one government in 
a position to act effectively for the Chinese State "the Court might be justified 
in accepting such a government as the proper representative of the State, even 
though our executive declined to deal with it. "82 Thus, in the absence of Ex-
ecutive guidance, the court based its decision on the government purporting to 
represent the State of China that the U.S. State Department deemed would 
best suit the interests of the U. S. Here public policy would prevail because it 
would not have been contrary to the Executive determination. 
In essence, viewing both claimants (the P.R.C. and Nationalist Govern-
ments) as functionally capable of assuming control of the assets the court 
looked to the Executive. In both cases ultimate disposition was to the Na-
tionalist Government. Originally, all Chinese assets were blocked by the 
Treasury Department;83 but following U.S. recognition of the Nationalist 
Government in Taiwan, the assets of Taiwanese nationals were unblocked. 84 
E. Possibilities of Recognition by the United States 
Regarding the problem of recognition four possible solutions can be 
discerned. The P.R.C. asserts that it is the sole Government representing 
China and that the Nationalist Government is not even a defacto government 
of Formosa. Under the first possibility, the Nationalist Government in 
Taiwan would be an unrecognized entity. If this had been the initial U.S. 
position, the P.R.C. would have had claim to all of the assets blocked in the 
U.S. Presently, the P.R.C. could only get the percentage of assets not already 
claimed by Nationalist Government agencies. 
A second possibility is the "Two Chinas" or the German solution. This 
plan would recognize two Chinese governments and two Chinese nations. 
Under the auspices of this solution both Chinese governments would have 
standing to sue with the claims proportionately divided relative to the percent-
age of territory controlled. 
Thirdly, is the "China-Taiwan" alternative. Under this proposal the 
P.R.C. would succeed to the rights of the Chinese state and Taiwan would be 
recognized as seceding from China. This would provide the Nationalist 
Government in Taiwan with standing in the courts of the United States but 
82. Id. at 66. 
83. Treasury Regulations placing Chinese nationals within the designated national territory 
for blocking of assets. 31 C.F.R. S 500.201, 500.305, 500.302 (1977). 
84. See 31 C.F.R. S 500.328 (1977) which excluded those areas under the control of the Na-
tionalist Government from the term "designated foreign country" as the term was used in the 
prohibitions set forth in S 500.201. 
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not to the extent of asserting governmental rights of the Chinese State which 
would have been acknowledged to be the P.R.C.8s 
Fourthly, and perhaps most desirable in view of the problems discussed in 
this Comment, is the "Japanese Formula" which was adopted by Japan. It 
consists of moving the embassy from Taiwan to Peking (de jure recognition) 
and moving the liaison office from Peking to Taiwan (de facto recognition).86 
III. PREADJUDICATED CLAIMS OF CITIZENS OF THE 
UNITED STATES AGAINST THE P.R.C. 
A. The Foreign Settlement Claims Commission 
In 1966 the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) was author-
ized to adjudicate claims to the remaining assets of the P.R.C. by amendment 
to Title II of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.87 The respon-
sibility under Title V of the Act was to adjudicate and certify claims by U. S. 
nationals who had lost assets in mainland China pursuant to the Declaration 
of December 29, 1950. The FCSC was authorized to: 
receive and determine in accordance with applicable substantive 
law, including, international law, the validity and amount of claims 
of nationals of the United States for: (1) losses resulting from the na-
tionalization, expropriation, intervention, or other taking of, or 
special measures directed against, property of nationals of the 
United States; and (2) disability or death, resulting from actions 
taken by or under the authority of the Chinese Communist Regime. 
All such claims must have arisen since October 1, 1949. . . . This 
statute was enacted in order to obtain information concerning the 
total amount of claims of nationals of the United States against the 
Chinese Communist Regime .... The statute does not provide for 
the payment of awards granted by the Commission, but authorizes a 
pre settlement of adjudication of claims for the purpose of any future 
negotiations with the Government of China. 88 
85. Comment, The United States and the People's Republic of China: The Blocked Assets - Claims 
Problem, 8 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 253, 268-71 (1975). 
86. Butterfield, Mr. Vance will Find the Main Topic in China is Still Taiwan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
21,1977, S E, at 3, col. 1. 
87. 80 Stat. 1365 (1966),22 U.S.C. S 1643 (1970), amending 78 Stat. 1110 (1964), specifically S 
503(a). The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission was created by President's Reorganization 
Plan No.1 of 1954,68 Stat. 1279 (1954),5 U.S.C. S 1331 (1970), which assigned the functions of 
the War Claims Commission and the International Claims Commission to the Foreign Claims 
Settlement Commission. Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 as added by 
Pub. L. No. 88-666, 78 Stat. 1100 (1964), approved October 16, 1964. Pub. L. No. 89-780, 88 
Stat. 1365 (1974), approved November 6, 1966, amended Title V to provide for the determina-
tion of the amounts of claims of nationals of the U.S. against the Chinese Communist Regime. 
88. U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Comm'n, 1972 Annual Report 417 (1973) [hereinafter 
cited as FCSC 1972 Report]. 
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The International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 as amended specifically 
provides: 
In the decision of claims under this [title], the Commission shall ap-
ply the following in the following order: (1) The provisions of the ap-
plicable claims agreement as provided in this subsection and (2) The 
applicable principles of international law , justice, and equity. 89 
Commenting on the function of the FCSC its then Commissioner wrote: 
The Commission interprets these principles in its decisions which 
then become precedents in the adjudication offuture cases. Thus the 
Commission helps to promote the development of a consistent body 
of law and precedent concerning international claims. 
Unlike its predecessors, the Commission is able to utilize the 
cumulative judicial and administrative experiences of its own prior 
programs to assure a prompt and equitable adjudication of all 
claims. Because of its status as a "court oflast resort," its decision 
assumes even greater importance as "valuable evidences of interna-
tional claims law" which manifest the progress and current status of 
the law of international claims and state responsibility. 90 
When the FCSC completed the China Claims Program on June 30, 1972 it 
had certified 384 out of 580 claims worth $196,861,834 without interest out of 
an original total claimed of $306,680,834. 91 
The completion of the preadjudicated claims settlement program does little 
for U.S. claimants. The Act specifically precludes any authorization for ap-
propriations for the payment of these claims. The awards are subject to future 
settlement. One commentator has concluded of the U.S. claimants: 
Their sole hope lies in the negotiation of a settlement between the 
U.S. and the P.R.C. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that 
89. 64 Stat. 12 (1950),22 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1958). 
90. Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Its Functions andJurisdiction, 60 MICH. L.REV. 
1079, 1101 (1962). On the matter of judicial review by the FCSC, see Lillich, Judicial Review and 
the FCSC, 15 AD.L.REV. 72, (1963) who writes: "As long as the Commission accords claimants 
procedural due process, its final decision certainly will be held to be non-reviewable". On the 
issue of reviewability see FCSC 1972 Report, supra note 88, which states: "The decisions of the 
Commission under the War Claims Act of 1948 and the International Claims Settlement Act of 
1949, as well as under all other statutes administered, are final and conclusive on all questions of 
law and fact and are not subject to review by any other official, department, agency, or any 
establishment of the United States, or by any court of mandamus or otherwise." Id. at 4. See also 
Redick, The Jurisprudence oj the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Chinese Claims, 67 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 728 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Redick]. For discussion of the procedure, history, and role of 
the FCSC see Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Completed Claims Programs, 3 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 101 (1963); Lillich, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission and the Protection oj Foreign In-
vestment, 48 IOWA L. REV. 779 (1963), see also Freidberg, A New Technique in the A4judication of Inter-
national Claims, 1 0 VA. J. INT'L L. 282 (1970). 
91. FCSC 1972 Report, supra note 88, Exhibit 20, at 506. 
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after all these years, virtually any substantial settlement would be ac-
ceptable to them, even for less than the full value of their claims. 92 
B. A nary tical Criteria for an Evaluation of the 
Applicability of a Lump Sum Agreement 
What are the analytical criteria for an evaluation of a lump sum agreement 
similar to the Litvinov Assignment? One scholar has commented: 
In appraising an en-bloc settlement by such terms, the judgments 
which become necessary are, first, whether a more desirable settle-
ment would have been obtained or could be obtained at some future 
time and, second, whether immediate advantages are 
adequate .... Discounted by all factors weighing against a settle-
ment sufficient advantages remain in the lump sum agreement to 
appraise it as the best possible solution. 93 
An examination of a lump sum settlement of the U. S. -P. R. C. blocked assets 
and claims reveals the following observations: 1) in view of the realities of the 
present socioeconomic situation of the P .R.C. there is little likelihood of addi-
tional funds being made available to supplement funds currently blocked in 
the U.S.; 2) the "inadequacy of the funds" does not pose a serious problem 
since previous U.S. claims settlement programs and foreign settlement claims 
programs have usually been for less than full value; 3) a less than full settle-
ment would not necessarily subject the U.S. Government to liability for the 
difference; and 4) the breakdown of the U.S. claimants reveals certain 
mitigating aspects based upon the prospective distribution of the inadequate 
funds. 
1. The Realities of the P.R.C. Position 
It is important to state initially that it is highly unlikely that the P.R.C. 
would agree to transfer any additional funds other than those assets which are 
already blocked in the U.S. This is so for several reasons: 
The particular circumstances of Chinese history, including unequal 
treaties, foreign commercial domination as a general result of the in-
ferior military position of China, and the general Communist op-
position to the cultural and political imperialism and exploitation 
which allegedly accompanied many of these financial and educa-
tional activities, will have their impact on an acceptable settlement of 
the claims. Moreover, in order to accept as valid all certified claims, 
92. Comment, The Uniud States and the PtDple's Republic of China The Blocked Assets - Claims 
Problem, 8 CORNEL INT'L L. J. 253, 264- (1975). This obvious conclusion was also expressed in 
Comment, Blocked Assets and Private Claims: The Initial Barriers to Trade Negotiations Between the U. S. 
and China, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 449 (1973). 
93. Christenson, The Uniud States-Rumanian Claims, Settlement Agreement of March 30, 1960, AM. 
J. INT'LL. 617, 635 (1961). 
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the P.R.C. would have to admit that certain of its previous govern-
mental decrees were against international law; for example, the 
claims resulting from the de facto "ransom" demands of the P.R.C. 
would seem particularly troublesome. If one sets the present day 
value of the claims, with interest, at $400,000,000, China would 
have difficulty, in the absence of an overall trade package with the 
United States in securing the foreign exchange to settle them, even if 
it should wish to do so. While the United States might settle for 
Chinese payment over a period of twenty years, as in the case of 
Poland, and more recently in the case of Hungary, China may not 
be willing to accept such a long-term debt. Moreover, with the 
P.R.C. now entering an expansive period offoreign policy, the need 
for $100-200 million annual foreign exchange trade surplus will be 
even greater. 9+ 
101 
Also, while the general rule of international law as expressed in the Restatement 
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States95 is that uncompensated tak-
ing of property is illegal: 
It is doubtful that the Chinese attitude toward international law is 
completely reconcilable with our own. While the record of the 
P.R.C. 's compliance with international agreements which that 
government entered into is good, the attitude of the P.R.C. toward 
pre-1949 agreements between the Republic of China and foreigners 
is generally unfavorable. While the claimants in the China Claims 
Program asserted private claims it is clear that their pre-1949 ac-
tivities in China followed a long history of foreign domination of the 
Chinese economy. 96 
2. "Inadequacy" of Funds 
On the assumption that any lump sum agreement would involve only those 
Chinese assets presently blocked in the U.S.97 several problems arise. 
a. Comparative Claims Programs Settlements 
There is no doubt that many U.S. claimants against the Chinese assets 
would raise objections to a settlement at 15 to 20 percent value and demand an 
additional payment from the P.R.C. Past settlement agreements with 
94. Redick, supra note 90 at 739. 
95. n 185-190 (1965). 
96. Redick, supra note 90, at 738-39; see also Seidl-Hohenveldem, Communist Theories on Con-
fiscation and Expropriation: Critical Comments, 7 AM. J. COMPo L. 541 (1958) (and sources cited 
therein). 
97. Executive power to block foreign assets arises from amendments to section 5(b) of the 
Trading With the Enemy Act. See note 3 supra. The primary blocking provisions of the Foreign 
Assets Control Regulations is 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1974). "Blocking" is, for the most part, a 
functionally descriptive term. Under § 500.201 all transactions covered by this section are pro-
hibited. Descriptively, what happens is that as a result of the prohibitions the assets are in effect 
blocked. 
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Yugoslavia,98 Rumania,99 BulgarialOo and Poland1ol have been for varying 
percentages of face value of the adjudicated awards by the FCSC. These 
figures are set out in Table 1. 
TABLE I 
Claims Programs Under the International Claims Settlement 














98. The United States accepted payment of 17 million dollars on 876 certified claims totaling 
18,817,890 dollars exclusive of interest. A total of 1,556 claims were originally filed. Claims Set-
tlement Agreement, July 19, 1948, United States-Yugoslavia, 62 Stat. 2658, T.I.A.S. No. 1803. 
See Coerper, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission andJw:licial Review, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 868 
(1956); Clay, Aspects of Settling Claims Under the Yugoslav Claims Agreement of 1948, 43 G EO. L.J. 582 
(1955); Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Completed Claims Program, 3 VA. J. INT'L L. 
101, 105 (1963). 
99. The United States accepted a lump sum of 24,526,370 dollars as the final settlement of 
total claims against Rumania which, with interest, amounted to 85 million dollars. The fund was 
made up of the blocked assets plus an additional 215 million dollars payable in five installments 
between July 1, 1960 andJuly 1, 1964. The 498 claims that were certified received approximately 
a 219 percent return of which 26 percent came from blocked assets and 2.9 percent from the addi-
tional2.5 million dollar payment. Claims Settlement Agreement, Mar. 30, 1960, United States-
Rumania, 11 U.S.T. 317, T.I.A.S. No. 4451; see Christenson, The United States-Rumanian Claims 
Settlement Agreement of March 30, 1960, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 617 (1961). 
100. The U.S.-Bulgarian Agreement of 1963 was a lump sum of 3,543,398 dollars. There 
were 391 claims of which only 217 were certified by the FCSC in the amount of6,571,825 dollars 
of which 4,684,187 dollars was principal and 1,887,638 dollars was interest. Of the 3,543,398 
dollars agreement, 3,143,398 dollars was composed of blocked assets in the U.S. with an addi-
tional $400,000 payment by the Bulgarian government. This total represented a 53.9 percent 
return of the total figure. Claims Settlement Agreement,July 2,1963, United States-Bulgaria, 14 
U.S.T. 969, T.I.A.S. No. 5387; see Lillich, The United States-Bulgarian Claims Agreement of 1963, 58 
AM. J. INT'L L. 686 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Lillich]. 
101. Claims Settlement Agreement, July 16, 1960, United States-Poland, 11 U.S.T. 1953, 
T.I.A.S. No. 4545. The agreement consisted of 40 million dollars to be paid over a 20 year period 
beginning January 1961. The number of awards certified totalled 5,022 while 5,147 claims were 
denied. The approved awards were in the amount of 100,737,581 dollars. The approximate per-
cent of awards paid was an estimated 36 percent. FCSC 1972 Report, supra note 88, at 34-35, 
reprinted in 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 540 (1961); see also Note, The American-Polish Claims Agreement of 
1960, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 452 (1961). 
102. Edited figures from FCSC 1972 Report, supra note 88, Exhibit 5, at 34-37. 
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Poland 3/31/66 36 % (Estimated) 
Bulgaria 8/9/59 $1,000 plus 69.710% 
TITLE III 
Bulgaria 12/24171 $1,000 plus 69.719% 
(second) 
Hungary 8/9/59 $1,000 plus 1.5% 
Rumania 8/9/59 $1,000 plus 37.841475% 
Rumania 12/24171 $1,000 plus 37.841474% 
(second) 
TITLE IV 
Czechoslovakia 9/15/62 $1,000 plus 5.303841 % 
In addition to this, claims programs in other countries seldom result in 
100 percent returns to certified claimants.lo3 
b. Legality of a Less Than Full Settlement 
It should be further noted at this point that there is little possibility of any 
successful litigation by claimants against the United States government for 
negotiating a less than full settlement. There exists no legal requirement that 
the U.S. compensate its nationals for differences between the amount of ad-
judicated claims and the actual amounts received from the lump-sum distribu-
tion. 10• The absolute nature of the lack of United States liability for a less than 
full settlement is brought into question by the holding of the Court of Claims 
in Seery v. United States. 105 After discussing the problems inherent in the pre ad-
judication of claims before funds have become available Lillich comments 
upon the legality of a less than full settlement: 
103. For example, British Claimants under 1955 Agreement between Bulgaria and the U.K. 
received interim payments from the British Foreign Compensation Commission amounting to 
32.6 percent of their claims under somewhat broader classifications of eligibility. Lillich, supra 
note 100; see also R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POSTWAR BRITISH PRACTICE (1967); R. 
LILLICH & B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM 
AGREEMENTS (1975); B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POSTWAR FRENCH PRACTICE 
(1971); Drucker, Compensation For NatioMlized Property: The British Practice, 49 AM. J. INT'LL. 477 
(1955); van Wees, Compensation for Dutch Property NatioMlized in East European Countries, 3 NETH. 
Y.B. INT'L L. 62 (1972); Note, Postwar Belgian Inler1UJtioMI Claims: Their Settlement by Lump Sum 
Agreements, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 554 (1973); Seidl-Hohenveldern, Austrian Practice on Lump Sum Com-
pensation by Treaty, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1976). 
104. "A state is under no obligation to its nationals in the international settlement of the 
claims of those nationals. Any amount received seems legally to be a national fund on which no 
claimant has a lien," A. NEILSON, AMERICAN-TuRKISH CLAIMS SETTLEMENT, OPINIONS AND 
REPORTS 4-5 (1937). 
105. 127 F.Supp. 601 (Ct. CI 1955). 
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This general statement, though, needs some qualification in view of 
Seery v. United States, where the Court of Claims held that the part 
of an executive agreement which withdrew Mrs. Seery's statutory 
right of action against the United States was unconstitutional, since 
it took her property without due process of law. Seery suggests that 
the Department of State, when negotiating a lump sum settlement 
after a domestic claims program, is under some compunction to seek 
terms exactly like those of the statute authorizing pre-adjudication 
(as interpreted by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission). For 
if an eligible claimant who had received an award under the statute 
was excluded from the terms of a subsequent settlement, he could 
well argue that he had been deprived of a vested right under a statute 
within the doctrine of the above case. On the other hand, if the Com-
mission in such a situation decided to make a further payment to the 
claimant, other awardees could argue with some justification that 
this action constituted a breach of the settlement agreement and an 
unlawful depletion of the additional funds received thereunder. 
Thus the Department of State negotiators were faced with the thorny 
problems of ascertaining the Commission's gloss on Title III, under 
which the Bulgarian claims were adjudicated, and then securing 
Bulgaria's consent to an agreement whose terms faithfully mirrored 
the gloSS.I06 
This must be tempered with the statutory language referring to claimants: 
Nothing in this title shall be construed as the assumption of any 
liability by the United States for the payment or satisfaction, in 
whole or in part, of any claim on behalf of any national of the United 
States against any foreign government. I07 
3. Mitigating Aspects of the "Inadequate" Fund Distribution 
Accepting these two assumptions as facing the reality of the present situa-
tion, i.e., Chinese recalcitrance to making additional funds available and the 
legality of a less than full settlement, would it, nevertheless, be possible to 
achieve a fair distribution of the assets blocked in the U. S.? While approx-
imately a 15 to 30 percent of recovery is possible as a simple proportion of 
blocked assets over claims this does not reveal the true situation at hand. The 
breakdown of the 197 million dollars of certified claims is revealing. Table II 
reveals that 9 corporate claimants represent 116 million of the total dollar 
claims. 
106. Lillich, supra note 100, at 690-91. 
107. 64 Stat. 16 (1950), 22 U.S.C. § 1626(1) (1958); 69 Stat. 575 (1955), 22 U.S.C. § 1641 
(1958). 
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TABLE II 
1. Shanghai Power Company 
2. Esso Standard 
3. Caltex Limited 
4. IT&T Corporation 
5. General Electric Company 
6. International Standard Electric Corp. 
7. Western District Power Co. Shanghai 
8. First National City Bank 












Corporations and individuals have been allowed to write off their losses109 in 
the course of Chinese nationalization of their assets. Certainly they would 
have such amounts set-off against any awards. Bayar comments on this factor: 
108. FCSC 1972 Report, supra note 88, at 508. 
1. Classification of Assets by Type of Assets 
Bank Deposits 
U.S. & Securities 
Notes, Drafts, Debts 




$ 5.9 million 
$ 1. 9 million 
2. Classification of Assets by Type of Owner 
Amounts (dollars) 
People's Republic of 
China 
Assets Held through 










$ 2.9 million 











U.S. Treasury Dep't, Census of Blocked Chinese Assets in the United States 3 (1970) (un-
published paper by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, copy available in the Boston College Inter-
national and Comparative Law Journal offices). 
109. I.R.C. S 165(a) (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(1). This section provides that, in 
computing taxable income under section 63, any loss actually sustained during the taxable year 
and not made good by insurance or some other form of compensation shall be allowed as a deduction. 
See Treas. Reg. , 1. 165-1(a), (b), (c), (d) for the nature ofloss allowable, the amount deductible, 
and the year of deduction. On the matter of losses deductible, see Alvarez v. United States, 431 
F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 913 (1971). The court held that a Cuban resident 
alien could not claim a loss under 26 U.S.C. §165(c) where he had owned rental property while 
resident of Cuba that was taken by state and indemnification given in form of monthly in-
stallments without interest, and monthly installments were terminated when alien failed to return 
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Aside from the equitable consideration of avoiding double compen-
sation for claimants, it need merely be pointed out that the blocked 
assets along could satisfy all validated claims except those of corpora-
tions and individuals which exceed $500,000. 110 
Another point that has received little attention is that settling the claims pro-
blem in the form of an agreement with the P.R.C. that does not require addi-
tional funds from the P.R.C. does not eliminate the possibility of an addi-
tional funds if its attitude should change in the future. As the FCSC stated in 
reference to the insufficiency of funds for the first Hungarian Claims Pro-
gram: 
Accordingly, payment to claimants were made on a pro rata basis 
with the understanding that additional amounts would be payable if 
additional funds should become available under the terms of a future 
claims agreement with Hungary .... 
Public Law 93-460 limits payments on new awards in the Second 
Program to the extent of the percentage paid on previous awards, 
and then permits the balance of the fund to be distributed propor-
tionately among all awardees in both programs. III 
Finally, some of the completed settlements discussed,112 were administered 
to Cuba since no profit could have resulted from ownership of right of indemnification, and the 
loss sustained did not meet profit motive test to qualify it as trade or business loss; there is no loss 
where there is reasonable prospect of recovery and taxpayer fails to file claim for loss against 
foreign government (Cuba) for property confiscated by that foreign government. Vila v. United 
States, 301 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1969) (taxpayer whose sugar plantation was confiscated 
otherwise expropriated, seized or taken by Government of Cuba on December 15, 1961, was en-
titled to loss under 26 U.S.C. S165(c)(1) as loss from his trade or business); for when the loss is 
deductible see Schweitzer v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 971 
(1967); (where taxpayers' Hungarian property was confiscated in 1949 and 1952 and they re-
ceived payment on property from Foreign Claims Settlement Commission in 1959, they could 
not deduct losses in latter year, since Tax Court had found, as fact on sufficient evidence, that 
they had no reasonable prospect of recovery for these losses at some future date). See also Selby v. 
Commissioner 33 T.C.M. 461 (1974) where taxpayers' loss of real estate in Shanghai occurred 
when the People's Republic of China came to power in 1949. Although taxpayer was never for-
mally advised of the seizure, he was "de facto deprived of any power or control" over the prop-
erty "from that point forward." It made no difference that the amount of his loss wasn't fixed by 
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission until '70. It's the year of the event of the loss which 
determines and that year was ' 49, since there remained after the seizure no realistic prospect of 
recovery or reimbursement. 
For the "reasonable probability" argument see Major v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. 386 
(1969) holding that loss deduction for real and personal property confiscated in Hungary was 
allowable in year of nationalization, and not in later year in which taxpayer argued that 
"reasonable probability" of recovery terminated. 
110. Bayar, The Blocked Chinese Assets: Present Status and Future Disposition, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 
959, 1007 (1975). 
111. U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Comm'n, 1975 Annual Report 32 (1976). 
112. See notes 99-103 supra and accompanying text. 
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on a flat S1000 dollar plus percentage basis. This procedure would be par-
ticularly applicable to the China Claims situation with few large claimants 
whose losses have been somewhat offset by tax breaks and many smaller 
claimants. 
C. Summary 
It has been observed that: 1) executive power to conclude an agreement ex-
ists;113 2) there is little current likelihood for additional funds to be made 
available by the P.R.C. to supplement funds currently blocked; 3) previous 
U.S. settlements and foreign settlements have usually been for less than full 
value; 4) a less than full agreement would not necessarily subject the U.S. 
government to liability for the difference and; 5) the circumstances relating to 
the China claimants are favorable in terms of a fair distribution. Quite simply, 
there is no compelling reason for the U.S. to persist in its demands for the 
P.R.C. to offer additional funds when its balance of payments and foreign 
trade situation is not one capable of accommodating such demands. Further, 
while the blocked assets are declining in value the adjudicated awards are in-
creasing at 6 percent interest. 
The positive features of ending the blocked assets-Chinese Claims problem 
in the form of an international assignment have been pointed at by other 
authors. One comments: 
A feasible model for a United States-Chinese agreement for the set-
tlement of these claims can be found in the "Litvinov Assignment" 
of 1933, under which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed 
to settle certain claims by the assignment to the United States of 
assets due the Soviet Government as the successor of prior govern-
ments of Russia. If the P.R.C. assigned to the United States its in-
terests in the assets blocked and frozen at the outset of the Korean 
Emergency, substantial funds would be made available to compen-
sate the China claimants, at least for 15 to 20 percent of their ad-
judicated losses. As under the War Claims Distribution of 1962 (but 
unlike the Litvinov Assignment), claimants with smaller individual 
claims should be fully compensated. In the China Claims Program, 
claimants with certified awards ofless than $100,000 account for on-
ly 10 percent of the total certified amount. 
As pointed out by one scholar, the use of a lump sum settlement 
avoids the express admission by the nationalizing country of the 
validity of any particular claim. Such a settlement would confirm the 
general liability of China to compensate U.S. nationals who lost 
property when relations between the United States and the P.R.C. 
113. See note 68 supra. 
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deteriorated in 1950. If the blocked Chinese assets were utilized, 
there also would be minimal impact on the foreign trade and internal 
development plans of the Chinese. 114 
While another suggests that: 
[t]his feature would provide not only for rapid implementation of the 
claims and assets agreement, but would also avoid the spectacle of 
the Senate's refusal to ratify a lump-sum agreement or other settle-
ment treaty with China the compensatory terms of which it found 
unsatisfactory. The implications of the Litvinov Assignment respect-
ing property rights and domestic law have already been "extensively 
litigated"; it is well established that such an assignment from China 
to the United States would validate China'il title to all the blocked 
assets and assign such title to the U.S. Government. The assets 
would then be vested, liquidated and distributed according to the 
congressional mandate. Since this transaction would be intimately 
connected with the conduct of foreign affairs, its recognition of 
China's title to the blocked assets would be binding on the courts. 115 
As will be discussed, it is important that any type of international assignment 
agreement be incidental to recognition of the P.R.C. Regime as with the Lit-
vinov Assignment. 
IV. LUMP SUM AGREEMENT AND RECOGNITION 
The negotiation of a lump sum settlement is a complex matter involving the 
interrelatedness of the recognition problem and the P. R. C. 's desire for trade 
concessions from the U. S. Charles Redick states that "it is too early to deter-
mine" that the claims settlement agreement will be settled in conjunction with 
the resolution of the issues of recognition and trade concession: 
With China Claims Program completed and its record certified to 
the Secretary of State, claimants now must look to the U.S. Govern-
ment for action which will bring them compensation for their losses. 
In considering the result of the completed program, it is not inap-
propriate to ask just what the response of the P.R.C. to it will be. 
Recent events indicate that the claims settlement may be part and 
parcel of a more comprehensive accord between the United States 
and the P.R.C., but it is still too early to determine whether this will 
be SO.116 
It is extremely unlikely, however, that an agreement could be reached in the 
absence of a solution to the recognition problem for several reasons. Charles 
Bayer, author of perhaps the most authoritative article on the Chinese Claims 
problem states that in the absence of recognition: 
114. Redick, supra note 90; at 740. 
115. Note 110 supra, at 1002-03. 
116. Redick, supra note 90, at 738. 
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unblocking the Chinese assets removes the prohibition on unlicensed 
legal proceedings to establish claims against them. While a claims 
settlement with China would serve to prevent any U.S. claimant 
from seeking compensation from a source other than the settlement 
fund, it would not bar the claims from foreign creditors and 
claimants. The crucial point in this regard is that the major foreign 
claimant will be Nationalist China. As of now, only $916 million in 
adverse claims against the blocked assets have been registered by 
Nationalist Chinese interests, but the registered claims represent on-
ly those claims in existence in 1950 and acted upon to some extent. It 
is most likely that Nationalist Chinese banks and emigre corpora-
tions each will lay claim to the previously blocked assets of their 
mainland counterparts, which amount to some $57.1 million. Per-
sons with relatives in China, claiming that assets sent there are likely 
to be confiscated, might seek to gain custody of the assets of their 
relatives, to be held for their benefit.1l7 
109 
A claims settlement accompanied by recognition of the P.R.C. would prevent 
the National Chinese Government and its agencies, now prohibited from 
asserting claims against the frozen assets, from doing so when they became 
unfrozen, as stated in Guaranry Trust Company v. United States1l8 and Russian 
Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario. 1I9 However, this would not be the 
case for a corporation or bank which is not an embodiment of the government, 
as both United States v. Insurance Cos. 120 and Sokoloff v. National Ciry Bank of New 
York121 have held. 
A. Litvinov Assignment122 
The Litvinov Assignment was an agreement between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union by which the U. S. accepted an assignment of certain claims due 
to the Soviet Union on November 16, 1933 in connection with the recognition 
of the Soviet Union. The note of the Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov 
which outlined the agreement provided that: 
The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not 
take any steps to enforce any decisions of courts or initiate any new 
117. Note 110 supra, at 1000. 
118. 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938). 
119. 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923). 
120. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 99 (1874). 
121. 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924). 
122. It should be kept in mind that in the past, i.e., prior to Pub. L. No. 95-223, there was 
power under S 5(b) to vest property unilaterally during a national emergency. Vesting (pursuant 
to a specific congressional authorization) remains an alternative to the lump sum agreement. It 
should be noted that the Litvinov Assignment was not entirely satisfactory since it involved a 
great deal of litigation. 
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litigations for the amounts admitted to be due or that may be found 
to be due it, as the successor of prior Governments of Russia, or 
otherwise, from American nationals ... and does hereby release and 
assign all such amounts to the Government ofthe United States . . 
123 
If an agreement analagous to the Litvinov Assignment is present then it can be 
assumed that the problems of "two Chinas" relating to the status of Na-
tionalist China vis-a-vis the U.S., Nationalist Chinese government vis-a-vis 
the Communist Regime, and all conflicting claims have been reconciled in 
such an agreement. As one scholar has noted referring to the consequences of 
one alternative: 
If the People's Republic of China assigned to the U. S. its interests in 
the assets blocked and frozen at the outset of the Korean emergency, 
substantial funds would be made available to compensate the China 
claimants at least for 15 to 20 percent of their adjudicated losses.124 
Indeed, the New York Times hinted that such a claims agreement may be part 
of a more all-inclusive and comprehensive accord between the U.S. govern-
ment and the People's Republic of China. 125 
One possible assumption implicit in such an agreement would be that the 
U.S. government's recognition of the Regime as the government of China 
would also include the recognition of the Nationalist Chinese government 
(Formosa and the Pescadores) as an independent state. Whatever the specific 
terms of such an agreement, they would undoubtedly clarify many of the pro-
blems that would arise with recognition in the absence of such an agreement as 
will be discussed below. In such a situation involving recognition and an in-
cidental agreement with the Regime, the defacto or dejure nature of recognition 
becomes irrelevant to the terms of such a controlling and determinative agree-
ment. The irrelevance of such a distinction owes to the holding expressed in 
the Tinoco Arbitration, 126 internal application of decrees in Luther v. Sagor, 127 and 
the conclusions of many authors as noted by Cochran who writes: 
the difference if any, is becoming less clear .... The existence of de 
facto recognition is becoming a moribund issue by not being raised 
as a possibility by the government. 128 
123. 2 FOR. REL. U.S. 813 (1933) as cited in W. FRIEDMAN, O. LISSITZYN& R. PUGH, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 194 n.5 (1969); see also R. FARRELL, AMERICAN DIPWMACY 362-63 (1959). 
124. Redick, supra note 90, at 740. 
125. Gwertzman, Roger's Initiates Talks with China on Asset Claims, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1973, 
at 1, col. 8. 
126. The Tinoco Claims Arbitration (Great Britain v. Costa Rica), 1 R. INT'LARB.AwARDS 
369 (1923). 
127. Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A.M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921]1 K.B. 456, rev'd 
on other grounds, [1921] 3 K.B. 532. 
128. Comment, The Developmmt of an Inter-American Policy for the Recognition of De Facto Govern-
ments, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 460 (1968). 
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He goes on to discuss the importance of the State Department's Digest as len-
ding authority to this position. 
According to one view, retroactivity129 is dependent upon de jure recogni-
tion130 in validating actions of a government from the commencement of its 
existence. The co-existence of two governments also makes the nature of the 
recognition accorded to the Regime meaningful. Such a distinction is impor-
tant in determining which of the governments, if either, may claim the ex-
traterritorial assets in the U.S. According to D. P. O'Connell: 
The de jure government remains exclusively competent with respect 
to State activities both within the territory over which it has retained 
control, and in the world at large outside the national territory. Con-
versely, the de facto government is competent extraterritorially. 131 
The effect of this distinction and the relationship with a third party to the pro-
ceedings, i.e., the "other" government, is dealt with in Civil Air Transport, Inc. 
v. Central Air Transport Corp.: 
retroactivity of recognition operates to validate acts of a de facto 
government which has subsequently become the new de jure govern-
ment and not invalidate acts of the previous de jure government. 132 
129. The most cogent discussion of the notion of retroactivity is by Fitzmaurice who states 
regarding retroactivity: 
The fact that (as is generally agreed) recognition, once given, operates retroactively to 
legitimize and give legal effect to the acts of the entity concerned, as from the date of its in-
ception, is sometimes cited as a stumbling-block to both the main theories of recognition. It 
certainly is so to the constitutive theory, because how can there be dating back in respect of 
something that did not exist at that time, and to a period preceding what was only con-
stituted by the recognition itseIt? But retroactivity is also said to be an objection to the 
declaratory view, because on the basis of that view, [an international person exists) and since 
the international person existed even previous to its recognition, no specific doctrine of 
retroactive ought to be necessary. The answer seems to be that on the declaratory view, it is 
not necessary. The entire doctrine of retroactivity in this context, is one which grew up with 
the original, constitutive, view of recognition, and was necessitated precisely because 
(though logically wholly at variance with it) the constitutive view required this practical ad-
justment. In short, retroactivity had to be postulated because the constitutive view never fit-
ted the facts. On the declaratory view, the doctrine of retroactivity is not so much abolished 
as rendered superfluous. Strictly, the question does not arise, since on this view recognition 
does not create the international person. 
Fitzmaurice, supra note 32, at 23 n.1. For a discussion of the misapplication of the concept by 
U.S. Courts see P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 66-67 (1948). 
130. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1978) (basing its decision on the ground 
that subsequent recognition of the Mexican government retroactively validated its acts, the Court 
gives affect to a seizure of property in Mexico by military authorities). In the absence ofrecogni-
tion to the P.R.C., unblocking the assets would subject those assets to litigation. For a different 
view seeJones, The Retroactive Effect of the Recognition of Slates and Governments, 16 BRIT. Y.B. INT'LL. 
42 (1935). For the position of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
U.S. (1965), see 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW S 96, at 29 (1963). 
131. 2 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 188 (2d ed. 1970). 
132. Civil Air Transport, Inc. v. Central Air Transport Corp., (1953) A.C. 70, 93 (P.C. 
1952). 
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B. Problem of Recognition Without a Lump Sum Agreement 
With recognition in the absence of a lump sum agreement by the U.S. the 
P.R.C. would subject itselfto counterclaims in bringing suit in U.S. courts to 
obtain control over confiscated assets. According to the Court's opinion in Na-
tional City Bank of N. Y. v. Republic of China,135 counterclaims against the 
government of China (in this case the P.R.C.) would be valid to the extent of 
the government's claim. This is not contrary to the concept of sovereign im-
munity as expressed in the Schooner Exchangem case because, in bringing suit in 
U.S. courts, the government submitted itself to the jurisdiction involved by 
such action and defenses by way of set-off and counterclaim are available 
against the original plaintiff in the case.135 
Another aspect of the possible consequences of recognition of the Regime as 
the government of China by the U.S. is implied in Petrogradsky.136 In the opi-
nion of the Court, the corporation was held to exist as ajuridical entity and en-
titled to the surplus of funds after claims to the funds had been taken care of. 
This case was a situation involving a non-recognized government. The asser-
tion of third party interests (in this case the defunct Imperial Russian govern-
ment and board of directors) not a party to the litigation is not authoritative 
and does not justify refusing to hand over the assets in question. A freezing of 
the assets in question, similar to the sine die decision of the District Court in 
Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust,137 might occur in the absence of recognition. 
Even with recognition, in the absence of an executive agreement incidental 
to it, the type of recognition remains unknown to the Court, unless it was de 
jure. In this sense, either form of recognition would lend weight to the 
Regime's legal position with regard to the assets in question but would not 
necessarily be determinative and valid retroactively unless the recognition ex-
tended was de jure because of the peculiarities of the "two Chinas Problem." 
Most importantly, in the absence of recognition of the P.R.C. by the U.S., 
the Nationalist Government would have the capacity to litigate for those assets 
as soon as they were unblocked. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is even greater incentive today to resolve the blocked Chinese assets 
and claims issues. As Sino-American relations continue to develop,138 these 
issues will remain an impediment. During an era of rapprochement when 
133. Note 79 supra. 
134. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
135. United States v. National City Bank of N.Y., 83 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.), em. denied, 299 U.S. 
563 (1936). 
136. Note 72 supra. 
137. Note 79 supra. 
138. This development has been manifested in various executive agreements, statements, pro· 
nouncements and actions. An early sampling of these would include: U.S. Dep't of State, 
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global interdependence extends beyond ideological curtains, the shadow of the 
protection of foreign investment remains. It is particularly important since the 
resolution of the sovereign immunities problem139 that has been the source of 
extensive litigation and academic dispute since Banco National de Cuba v. Sab-
batinoYo As the United States seeks to clarify the status of sovereigns in its 
courts, many pressing issues exist. One has been examined here. 
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